Network Working Group V. Smyslov Internet-Draft ELVIS-PLUS Intended status: Standards Track 19 June 2023 Expires: 21 December 2023 Alternative Approach for Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-08 Abstract An IKEv2 extension defined in [RFC8784] allows IPsec traffic to be protected against someone storing VPN communications today and decrypting it later, when (and if) cryptographically relevant quantum computers are available. However, this protection doesn't cover an initial IKEv2 SA, which might be unacceptable in some scenarios. This specification defines an alternative way get protection against quantum computers, but unlike the [RFC8784] solution it covers the initial IKEv2 SA too. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 December 2023. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Alternative Approach Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Computing IKE SA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Comparison of the Conventional and the Alternative Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Introduction The Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2, defined in [RFC7296], is used in the IPsec architecture to perform authenticated key exchange. [RFC8784] defines an extension of IKEv2 for protecting today's VPN traffic against future quantum computers. At the time this extension was being developed, it was a consensus in the IPSECME WG that only IPsec traffic needs to have such a protection. It was believed that no sensitive information is transferred over IKE SA and extending the protection to also cover IKE SA traffic would require serious modifications to core IKEv2 protocol, that contradicted to one of the goals to minimize such changes. For the cases when this protection is needed it was suggested to immediately rekey IKE SA once it is created. In some situations it is desirable to have this protection for IKE SA from the very beginning, when an initial IKE SA is created. An example of such situation is Group Key Management protocol using IKEv2, defined in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2]. In this protocol session keys are transferred from Group Controller/Key Server (GCKS) to Group Members (GM) immediately once an initial IKE SA is created. While it is possible to postpone transfer of the keys until the IKE SA is rekeyed (and [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2] specifies how to do this), the needed sequence of actions introduces an additional delay and adds unnecessary complexity to the protocol. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 Since [RFC8784] was written, a new IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange for IKEv2 was defined in [RFC9242]. While the primary motivation for developing this exchange was to allow multiple key exchanges to be used in IKEv2 (which is defined in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke]), the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange itself can be used for other purposes too. This specification makes use of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange to define an alternative approach to [RFC8784], which allows getting protection against quantum computers for initial IKE SA. 2. Terminology and Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. We will use a term Conventional Approach in the content of using PPK to refer to the [RFC8784] and a term Alternative Approach to refer to this specification. 3. Alternative Approach Description The IKE initiator who supports the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange and wants to use PPK includes both the INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED and the USE_PPK notifications in the IKE_SA_INIT request. If the responder supports the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange and is willing to use PPK, it includes both these notifications in the response. Initiator Responder ------------------------------------------------------------------ HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED), N(USE_PPK) ---> <--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ,] N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED), N(USE_PPK) If this is the case, then the initiator MAY choose to use the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange to negotiate PPK identity with the responder. Note, that it is up to the initiator whether to use the alternative or conventional approaches, i.e. whether to send PPK identity in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange or in the IKE_AUTH exchange, as defined in the [RFC8784]. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 If the initiator decides to use alternative approach, it includes one or more PPK_IDENTITY_KEY notification containing PPK identities the initiator believes are appropriate for the IKE SA being created, into the IKE_INTERMEDIATE request. The PPK_IDENTITY_KEY is a Status Type IKEv2 notification. Its Notify Message Type is , Protocol ID and SPI Size fields are both set to 0. The format of the notification data is shown below on Figure 1. 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | ~ PPK_ID ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | + PPK Confirmation + | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 1: PPK_IDENTITY_KEY Notification Data Format Where: * PPK_ID (variable) -- PPK_ID as defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC8784]. * PPK Confirmation (8 octest) -- value, which allows the responder to check whether it has the same PPK as the initiator for a given PPK_ID. This field contains the first 8 octets of a string computed as prf( PPK, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr ), where prf is the negotiated PRF; PPK is the key value for a specified PPK_ID; Ni, Nr, SPIi, SPIr -- nonces and IKE SPIs for the SA being established. If a series of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges takes place, the PPK_IDENTITY_KEY notification(s) MUST be sent in the last one, i.e. in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange immediately preceding the IKE_AUTH exchange. If the last IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange contains other payloads aimed for some other purpose, then the notification(s) MAY be piggybacked with these payloads. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 Initiator Responder ------------------------------------------------------------------ HDR, SK { ... N(PPK_IDENTITY_KEY, PPK_ID_1) [, N(PPK_IDENTITY_KEY, PPK_ID_2)] ... [, N(PPK_IDENTITY_KEY, PPK_ID_n)]} ---> Depending on the responder's capabilities and policy the following situations are possible. a. If the responder doesn't support the alternative approach, it will ignore the received PPK_IDENTITY_KEY notification(s) and won't include any additional notifications in the response. Initiator Responder --------------------------------------------------------------- <--- HDR, SK { ... } In this case the initiator cannot make an initial IKE SA to be a quantum computer resistant, so if this is a requirement for the initiator, then it MUST abort creating IKE SA. Otherwise, the initiator continues with the IKE_AUTH exchange as described in [RFC8784]. b. If the responder supports this extension, but doesn't have any of the PPKs which IDs were sent by the initiator or it has some of proposed PPKs, but their values mismatch the initiator's ones (based on the information from the PPK Confirmation field), then it MUST return the PPK_IDENTITY notification containing no data. Initiator Responder --------------------------------------------------------------- <--- HDR, SK { N(PPK_IDENTITY) } In this case the initiator cannot achieve quantum computer resistance using the proposed PPKs. If this is a requirement for the initiator, then it MUST abort creating IKE SA. Otherwise, the initiator continues with the IKE_AUTH exchange as defined in [RFC7296]. The initiator SHOULD NOT fall back to the IKE_AUTH exchange defined in [RFC8784] in this case, since the initiator already knows that no one of the proposed PPKs is suitable for the responder. If using PPK is mandatory for the responder, then it will send back the AUTHENTICATION_FAILED notification in the IKE_AUTH response (as specified in Table 1 of [RFC8784]). Otherwise the IKE SA will be created as per [RFC7296]. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 c. If the responder supports this extension and is configured with one of the PPKs which IDs were sent by the initiator and this PPK matches the initiator's one (based on the information from the PPK Confirmation field), then the responder selects this PPK and returns back its identity in the PPK_IDENTITY notification. Initiator Responder --------------------------------------------------------------- <--- HDR, SK { ... N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID_i)} In this case the IKE_AUTH exchange is performed as defined in [RFC7296], so that neither PPK_IDENTITY nor NO_PPK_AUTH notifications are sent, since it's already known which PPK to use. However, the keys for the IKE SA are computed using PPK, as described in Section 4. If the responder returns PPK identity that was not proposed by the initiator, then the initiator must treat this as a fatal error and MUST abort the IKE SA establishment. Note, that in the last two cases the IKE_AUTH exchange is performed as per [RFC7296], despite the fact that peers exchanged the USE_PPK notifications in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, and, according to the [RFC8784], they were required to use the modified IKE_AUTH exchnage defined there. This requirement is relaxed if peers follow this specification. Since the responder selects PPK before it knows the identity of the initiator, a situation may occur, when the responder agrees to use some PPK in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, but later discovers during the IKE_AUTH exchange that this particular PPK is not associated with the initiator's identity in its local policy. Note, that the responder does have this PPK, but it is just not listed among the PPKs for using with this initiator. In this case the responder SHOULD abort negotiation and return back the AUTHENTICATION_FAILED notification to be consistent with its policy. However, if using PPK with this initiator is marked optional in the local policy, then the responder MAY continue creating IKE SA using the negotiated "wrong" PPK. 4. Computing IKE SA Keys Once the PPK is negotiated in the last IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the IKE SA keys are recalculated. Note that if the IKE SA keys are also recalculated as the result of the other actions performed in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange (for example, as defined in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke], then applying PPK MUST be done after all of them, so that recalculating IKE SA keys with PPK is the last action before they are used in the IKE_AUTH exchange. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 The IKE SA keys are computed differently compared to [RFC8784]. A new SKEYSEED' value is computed using the negotiated PPK and the most recently computed SK_d key. Note, that the PPK is applied to SK_d exactly how it is specified in [RFC8784], and the result is used as SKEYSEED'. SKEYSEED' = prf+ (PPK, SK_d) Then the SKEYSEED' is used to recalculate all SK_* keys as defined in Section 2.14 of [RFC7296]. {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr} = prf+ (SKEYSEED', Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr ) In the formula above Ni and Nr are nonces from the IKE_SA_INIT exchange and SPIi, SPIr - SPIs of the IKE SA being created. Note, that SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr are not individually recalculated using PPK, as it is defined in [RFC8784]. The resulting keys are then used in the IKE_AUTH exchange and in the created IKE SA. 5. Comparison of the Conventional and the Alternative Approaches This specification isn't intended to be a replacement for [RFC8784]. Instead, it is supposed to be used in situations where the conventional approach has a significant shortcomings. However, if the partners support both approaches, then the alternative approach MAY also be used in situations where convenient approach suffices. The alternative approach has the following advantages: 1. The main advantage of the alternative approach is that it allows an initial IKE SA to be protected against quantum computers. This is important for those IKE extensions which transfer sensitive information, e.g. cryptographic keys, over initial IKE SA. The prominent example of such extensions is [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2]. 2. Using the alternative approach allows the initiator to specify several appropriate PPKs and the responder to choose one of them. This feature could simplify PPK rollover. 3. With the alternative approach there is no need for the initiator to calculate the content of the AUTH payload twice (with and without PPK) to support a situation when using PPK is optional for both sides. Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 The main disadvantage of the alternative approach is that it requires an additional round trip (the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange) to set up IKE SA. However, if the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange has to be used for some other purposes in any case, then PPK stuff can be piggybacked with other payloads, thus eliminating this penalty. 6. Security Considerations Security considerations of using Post-quantum Preshared Keys in the IKEv2 protocol are discussed in [RFC8784]. This specification defines an alternative way of exchanging PPK identity information. 7. IANA Considerations This document defines a new Notify Message Type in the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types" registry: PPK_IDENTITY_KEY 8. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Paul Wouters for valuable comments and Tero Kivinen for pointing out to the problem of mismatched preshared keys. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, . [RFC8784] Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., McGrew, D., and V. Smyslov, "Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security", RFC 8784, DOI 10.17487/RFC8784, June 2020, . Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Alternative PPK for IKEv2 June 2023 [RFC9242] Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9242, DOI 10.17487/RFC9242, May 2022, . 9.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2] Smyslov, V. and B. Weis, "Group Key Management using IKEv2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- ipsecme-g-ikev2-09, 19 April 2023, . [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke] Tjhai, C., Tomlinson, M., Bartlett, G., Fluhrer, S., Van Geest, D., Garcia-Morchon, O., and V. Smyslov, "Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-12, 1 December 2022, . Author's Address Valery Smyslov ELVIS-PLUS PO Box 81 Moscow (Zelenograd) 124460 Russian Federation Phone: +7 495 276 0211 Email: svan@elvis.ru Smyslov Expires 21 December 2023 [Page 9]